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This paper offers some reflections on the institutions for the
governance of knowledge as an economic asset, and its
management in firms. It then relies on a research based on a
survey of a large number of patents (PatVal-EU) to discuss
specific features of the invention system in Italy. The paper ends
by suggesting that Italy is an interesting position to launch new
policies that balance intellectual property rights and open
source. It also flags the possibility of an Inventor Compensation
Act like in Germany, which can motivate employees to launch
new ideas and raise the Italian innovation rate. [JEL
Classification: O31, O32, O34]
Key words: open source, patents, intellectual property rights,
innovation.
1. - Introduction
Different factors of production have been central for
economic growth in different epochs (land, capital, etc.). At the
firm-level, this has been paralleled by the development of
specific managerial techniques to govern these resources. At the
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04 Gambardella_57_84  3-06-2009  11:12  Pagina 57system-level this has stimulated the formation of institutions for
the development and exchange of the underlying assets. A
classical example is the rise of the managerial corporation,
based on the decentralization of activities in divisions
(Chandler, 1990). This made it possible to govern large firms
that exploited economies of scale associated to large
investments in physical capital. Similarly, Rosenberg and
Birdzell (1986) discuss the historical origin of several
institutions of capitalism, like property rights on land, the bill
of exchange, commercial law, double-entry book-keeping. They
show that these institutions were prompted by the rise of new
factors that could be best exploited by creating suitable
institutions to handle them.
In this vein, it is widely argued that the past few decades
have opened up a new epoch for capitalism. Knowledge and
ideas have become a central factor in production, if not the
central factor. As a result, we observe the rise of new
managerial techniques to govern them, and the formation of
the corresponding institutions.
This paper has two goals. First, it illustrates some recent
trends in managerial techniques and institutions regarding
knowledge and ideas. Second, it focuses on the Italian case,
showing that Italy is lagging behind in the management of
intangibles, and it is not part of the international debate on the
formation of the new institutions that govern these assets.
The paper takes deliberately the form of an overview of these
issues. This has the cost that some of the statements made here
are suggestive and call for additional research. Yet, it can point
out broad system- and firm-level policy issues. Moreover, it tries
to provide an architectural perspective rather than focusing on
one dimension of the problem. In particular, the world of
intellectual property rights (IPRs) and that of open source do not
normally communicate. The economic or managerial research on
these matters is itself often separate. This paper discusses both
phenomena along with their implications for firms or policy, and
for one another.
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Some of the trends in the current economy of knowledge and
ideas can be summarized as follows:
— the number of annual patent applications has increased
significantly worldwide 
— there is an equally significant growth of the so-called open-
source approaches to the production of knowledge, which em-
phasize diffusion and non-appropriation of knowledge outcomes
— many companies are investing in new techniques for
managing intellectual property, including the combined
management of intellectual property and open source
— there is growing technology trade worldwide (the so-called
“markets for technology”)
— the valuation of intellectual property has become a central
issue, as we have little information on the economic values of
patents or more generally of ideas
— there is a good deal of discussion about IPR policy that
hinges on the reform of the patent system and on how to combine
the benefits of intellectual property and open source
We shall discuss these trends one by one.
2.1 Growth of Patents
Graph 1 reports the growth in the number of patent
applications to the European Patent Office (EPO) between 1994
and 2004. The trends are similar if one looks at the patents applied
for at the US or Japanese patent office or at the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO). 
The rise in the number of patents is both good and bad news.
It stems from some genuine increase in innovation, as noted for
instance by Kortum and Lerner (1999). Moreover, as again noted
by Kortum and Lerner (1999), this corresponds in part to an
increase in patenting by smaller firms or new applicants, which
suggests that the rise is not produced only by established
companies that may monopolize innovation. As we shall discuss,
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property rights on inventions, which encourages, among other
things, technology trade and then innovation and the diffusion of
knowledge.
Yet, the increase in patents also stems from the growth in
“strategic” patents (e.g., Von Graevenitz et al., 2007). They are
patents produced not to implement an innovation but to block
others from pursuing innovations in a given area. The issue has
become significant because in some cases firms have flooded a
field with their patents. This implies that nobody can invest in
research without running a serious risk of infringing some other
patents. Sometimes this is solved by cross-licensing agreements.
Yet, in some cases it stifles innovation. In particular, even when
the problem can be solved via cross-licensing, new entrants or
firms that are not part of the recognized oligopolistic core may
find it hard to enter into such agreements. 
Another growing practice is the application of the so-called
divisonals. Divisionals are patents that claim to be a continuation
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04 Gambardella_57_84  3-06-2009  11:12  Pagina 60of an earlier patent application, and thus get the priority of the
earlier invention. This gives an early priority to a late invention
even when the link between them is weak. Strategic patenting has
also prompted the rise of patent trolls, viz. applicants that patent
minor inventions with the only goal of accusing others of
infringement, and thus collecting licensing royalties. Finally, the
growth in the number of patents is associated to an increase in
the number of “trivial” patents, i.e., innovations that do not satisfy
the criterion of non-obviousness, but still pass the examination
bar (e.g., Jaffe and Lerner, 2004). Trivial patents create confusion,
offer opportunities for trolling behavior, and consume examination
time and resources of the patent offices.
Solutions to these problems are not easy, as they entail some
reform of the patent system. An interesting mechanism in this
respect is the opposition system in force at the EPO. Compared
to the US patent system, the EPO features a grace period in which
a patent is applied for but can be opposed by third parties before
the patent is granted. The opposition is evaluated by the EPO and
the patent is granted or not taking into account the oppositions.
The advantage is that the patent office can collect information on
potential limitations of the grant before the grant takes place. By
contrast, in the US system, oppositions to the patent can only take
place after the grant, which means that they can only be carried
out in court, with litigation expenses.
Finally, the raise in applications is flooding the patent offices,
whose resources have not increased at the pace of applications.
Apart from delays in processing them, some of the problems
raised above are a consequence of the pressures on the patent
offices. Pressed with time, the patent examiners are more lenient
towards acceptance than rejection. Rejecting an application
requires more time and effort because one has to demonstrate
why the application is unsatisfactory. By contrast, applicants do
not press the patent office with questions or clarifications when
the application is successful. Thus, trivial patents, or divisionals
that should not be given an earlier priority date, slip into the
system.
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The past decade has also witnessed a notable growth in the
open-source system. Open source hinges on the idea that the
developers of a software code diffuse it through the web and attach
to the code a Generalized Public License or GPL
1. This is a
licensing right whereby anyone can use the code and make
improvements provided that she attaches the same licensing right
to her innovations — that is, the modified code or the innovation
has to be diffused openly through a GPL. The open-source system
is most diffused in the development of software. However, the
institutions and the open-source mechanisms are being explored
in other fields (e.g. biotechnology). Moreover, there are variants of
the GPL, like the less restrictive BDL (Berkeley Development
License), which allows for the privatization of some improvements.
The important point for our purposes is that the GPL is an
institution that can ensure that an entire trajectory of research re-
mains public. One way to think about it is that while patents es-
tablish that a certain piece of research is privatized, the initiator
of a GPL project can establish that the entire project has to stay
in the public domain. We do not enter here in the mechanisms,
the motivations, or the sustainability of open source and particu-
larly of the GPL system (see, e.g. Lerner and Tirole, 2002). What
is most important for our discussion is the nature of the institu-
tion and the fact that it has implications for the production and
diffusion of knowledge. In particular, it can balance the negative
implications of the patent system. A proper policy architecture can
then define which types of knowledge are to be made public and
which ones can be privatized. 
Broadly speaking, only narrow ideas or knowledge should be
allowed to become private. General knowledge or technologies
with many potential applications should not be made private as
this may forestall innovation in areas that the patent owner does
not pursue, or in which he deliberately blocks others. By contrast,
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well defined innovations. The experience so far is that the patent
system may be unable to fully ensure such limits to the
privatization of knowledge, or it cannot prevent confusions and
undesired consequences. An enforceable GPL system could then
play an important role in an architectural policy with these goals.
However, a central problem is how to enforce the GPL sys-
tem. Within the communities of software developers it is enforced
via reputation and sociological factors. If the system has to spread
beyond these communities one needs other sources of enforce-
ments, particularly with respect to agents — and primarily the in-
dustrial system — that are not motivated by the same rules. At
the same time, we need to understand how a GPL system can be
implemented beyond software. As noted, open source is diffusing
to other contexts, though the diffusion is slow, as software offers
ideal conditions (easy exchange of the programs or communica-
tion through the web, established communities of developers, etc.).
However, the implementation of the mechanism simply requires
that the institution of the GPL (or its variants) is made enforce-
able through the legal system. In short, the hard task is creating
the enforcement. If so, a GPL could apply in principle to software,
biotech or any other technology.
2.3 Management of Intellectual Property, Open Source and Spinoffs
Companies are increasingly paying attention to the
management of intellectual property. This implies greater attention
to opportunities of both selling their intellectual property (e.g.,
Rivette and Kline, 2000) and buying it from others. Since the
1990s this has implied the creation of special units inside the firms
for managing licensing (both buy and sell), and more generally it
has led to view intellectual property as a strategic asset to manage
(e.g. Grindley and Teece, 1997). 
Interestingly, this has been paralleled by greater attention to
open source as well, especially in the information technology and
software business. As noted by Lerner and Tirole (2002), tapping
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can access talented programmers, or they can use and improve
software programs that are relevant for their purposes, or the
distribution of open-source products may increase the demand for
complementary products that the firm sells on a proprietary basis. 
However, the interesting twist here is that, as shown by
Fosfuri  et al. (2008), companies are more likely to access open
source and exchange information openly with open-source
communities when they can secure complementary products or
technologies with IPR. This is natural as on the one hand they
can benefit from open source and at the same time participate in
these activities, while on the other hand they remove potential
preoccupations about intellectual property that they want instead
to keep proprietary. 
Finally, companies are increasingly using spinoffs as a means
of exploring technological areas that they may want to tap in the
future. Most often, they leave a good deal of autonomy to these
firms (e.g., Chesbruogh, 2003). When and if these firms become
successful they try to establish new relationships with them. In
many cases they do not reintegrate these companies when they
are successful. They develop links in the form of strategic alliances,
licensing or cross-licensing deals, or they keep supporting them by
offering complementary assets like downstream production or
commercial activities or complementary R&D (e.g., Allen, 1998).
2.4 Growth in Technology Trade
A notable trend in recent years is the growth in technology
trade among independent parties. This takes the form of licensing,
strategic alliances and other forms of collaboration on the
production of innovations, which we lump under the general label
of technology markets (Arora et al., 2001a). At the aggregate level,
OECD data show that in the G8 countries, from 1980 to 2003,
technology royalty payments and receipts have increased by an
average annual factor of 10.7%, reaching a volume of about USD
190,000 million in 2003 (OECD, 2006). 
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has some important implications. First, they create efficiency
advantages due to the fact that the producer of an innovation is
not necessarily the best organization to carry out its further
development or commercialization. For example, many innovative
ideas come from smaller firms that do not have the proper large
scale assets for efficient downstream processes. Technology
markets then produce two advantages. First, the producer of
technology may be able to gain a higher revenue from licensing
the technology vis-à-vis developing it internally. For example, the
larger scale operations of the technology buyer may produce
economies that the upstream technology specialist firm is unable
to attain, which produces gains from trade. Second, at the system
level, this creates the typical advantages of specialization and
division of labor. Smaller firms are most often better environments
for producing innovative ideas, while larger firms are relatively
more effective in developing them. To the extent that there can be
specialization according to comparative advantages, this division
of labor between large and small firms in innovation can generate
efficiency gains at the system level (e.g., Arrow, 1983). 
A related advantage is that when technology markets function
properly smaller innovative firms can invest in innovation even if
they do not own the downstream assets to carry out the develop-
ment and commercialization stages. If technology markets did not
exist, or they had high transaction costs, small innovative firms
would not invest in innovation unless they own the assets for car-
rying out the full innovation development and commercialization
process. But as noted, many small firms may have comparative
advantages upstream, without owning such downstream assets.
Thus, with no technology markets they will not carry out the in-
vestments in innovation in the first place, which reduces the in-
novation rate of the economy. In addition, innovation is most of-
ten an uncertain process, and the development of successful in-
novations may require exploration of different opportunities. Tech-
nology markets enable the upstream technology specialist firms to
focus on the upstream investments for innovation. To the extent
that this does not require large capital investments upfront, they
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as they do not have to sink large assets in the process. By con-
trast, if the returns from innovation only came from the full in-
tegrated investment in both upstream and downstream assets, they
would not engage in exploration, as failures entail a larger cap-
ital loss. Thus, technology trade produces more exploration.
Technology markets have other advantages. First, many patents
are “sleeping” patents, in the sense that they are not exploited
economically by the patent owner. There could be many reasons.
For instance, research produces internal spillovers. Firms then
patent by-products of the main innovations that they seek, even if
they do not intend to exploit them. Sometimes, they patent mainly
to provide inventors with incentives and recognition. Whatever the
reasons, technology trade enables the firms to profit from their
sleeping patents, as they can license them to other firms that may
instead profit from their economic exploitation. At present, there
is evidence that large firms are important reservoirs of sleeping
patents that can be licensed (Rivette and Kline, 2000; Gambardella
et al., 2007). Apart from revenue advantages at the firm level, this
raises the rate of exploitation of patents at the system level.
Finally, technology markets can have implications for
downstream competition. The presence of specialized technology
suppliers, or more generally of firms that are willing to license
their technologies, means that downstream firms that do not have
upstream technological capabilities can acquire the technology in
any case. This raises competition as it favors firms that may not
enter the product market because of their inability to produce
technologies internally, but that nonetheless have valuable
downstream capabilities. Arora et al. (2001b) show these patterns
in the context of the chemical processing industry. By using data
on chemical plants in developing countries they show that the
domestic producers in the less advanced economies are more
likely to invest when there are engineering firms from the First
World that license the process technologies. At the same time,
multinational firms are not affected by the presence of these
technology suppliers, as they are more likely to be able to produce
the technologies internally. Thus, when technology suppliers are
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have better opportunities to enter.
2.5 The Economic Value of Patents
But what is the economic value of patents or intellectual
property more generally? The question is important because in
order to set the present discussion in the right perspective we need
to understand the orders of magnitude involved. 
Unfortunately we have little information on the economic
value of patents. To be sure, we first need to clarify what we mean
by the value of patents. Particularly, we distinguish between the
value of a patent as an asset vs. the value of the licensing right.
The former is the value of the patent when the property of the
patent is transferred to the buyer. In this case, the buyer inherits
the right to exclude others from using the technology protected
by the patent. The latter is the value of the right to use the patent
when the suppliers keep the property of the patent. Clearly, the
former is higher than the latter.
Today, some information has become available thanks to the
disclosure of the prices paid by the licensees of the patent auctions
held by a patent intermediating company, Ocean Tomo
(www.oceantomo.com). In addition, a research on the value of
European patents (PatVal-EU) has retrieved information on the
value of patents from interviews with the patent inventors (see
Giuri  et al., 2007). Both the Ocean Tomo and PatVal-EU data
measure the value of the patent as an asset. 
Graph 2 reports the frequency distribution of the Ocean Tomo
and PatVal-EU data. The Ocean Tomo data are actual prices, while
the PatVal-EU survey asked the inventors to cast the value of the
patent in classes, which are the ones used in Graph 2. Another
difference is that the Ocean Tomo values refer to lots composed
of one or more patents, while PatVal-EU refers to one specific
patent. However, most of the Ocean Tomo patents in a lot are
“equivalents” of the US patent (which is the focal patent for Ocean
Tomo), that is they are the same patent granted by a different
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European Patent Office (EPO) patents. Since EPO patents cover
all the European countries in which the applicant asked for
coverage, they can be thought of as including the equivalent
patents within Europe. Also, in evaluating the PatVal-EU patents,
inventors probably had in mind the full set of equivalent and
complementary patents protecting a given invention. The
difference between Ocean Tomo’s patent lots and PatVal-EU
individual patents may then not be that critical. Finally,  the value
classes in PatVal-EU are in euro, while the Ocean Tomo data are
in US dollars. Since there is only primitive information on patent
values, and even discussing orders of magnitude is informative,
we treat Euros and dollars at 1:1.
There are some differences between the two distributions. The
frequency distribution of the Ocean Tomo values is more volatile.
This is expected as actual transactions are affected by factors and
sources of heterogeneity (e.g., in the bargaining process, in the
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of the patent value as formulated by the inventors. Moreover, the
Ocean Tomo distribution is based only on 133 observations vs.
8220 PatVal-EU patents. With fewer observations one can only
expect a more volatile picture. But the most important difference
is  probably that there are PatVal-EU responses in the very right
tail of the distribution, and not for Ocean Tomo. We also compared
the two distributions by only looking at the PatVal-EU patents that
were licensed to account for the fact that very valuable patents
may not be licensed. We still find some PatVal-EU patents in the
very right tail of the distribution. While this stems in part from
the fact that inventors may exaggerate the assessment of their
patents, it can also stem from the far fewer observations of the
Ocean Tomo distribution. With asymmetric distributions, values in
the right tail are rare, and hence they can only be observed when
the sample is large. Moreover, the Ocean Tomo patents are typically
in electronics and information technology. Unlike PatVal-EU, they
exclude for example the pharmaceutical patents, some of which
can be very valuable. All in all, while I think that the subjective
assessment of the inventors may shift the PatVal-EU distribution
to the right compared to the true distribution of patent values, the
Ocean Tomo distribution may not make justice of the fact that
some patents can fall in the very right tail. 
As shown in Gambardella et al. (2008), after controlling for
some upward bias of the PatVal-EU patent distribution, the mean
of the PatVal-EU patents is about 3 million Euros. Gambardella
et al. (2008) note that the German inventors are likely to make
more precise estimates of the value of their patents. This is
because the German Inventor Compensation Act establishes that
inventors are to be compensated by their employers for their
patented inventions in relation to the value of the patent (Harhoff
and Hoisl, 2007). Thus, they are probably aware of some actual
estimate of the value of patents. Regressions in Gambardella et al.
(2008) find that other things being equal a dummy for German
inventors reduces the value of the patent to about 43%. This
measure was applied as a rule of thumb to obtain the mean of 3
million euro discussed above.
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PatVal-EU distribution is 380K Euros and the mode is 6K Euros.
These are typical parameters of very asymmetric distributions
(very high mean, high median, low mode). By contrast, the mean
of the Ocean Tomo patents is only 300K dollars, and its median
is 165K. It is interesting because the two medians are similar,
while the difference between the two means clearly depends on
the fact that the Ocean Tomo distribution does not exhibit a long
right tail, which in asymmetric distributions is the main culprit
for the high mean. Previous literature estimated skewed
distributions of patent values, more similar to PatVal-EU than
Ocean Tomo (e.g., Scherer and Harhoff, 2000). This suggests that,
even though the inventors may give inflated responses, the true
mean of the distribution of patent values is probably between that
of Ocean Tomo and PatVal-EU since Ocean Tomo does not take
into account the possibility of a long right tail. Be that as may,
the bottom line of this discussion is that patent values can be
significant, even though they are quite skewed, with many patents
that are not worth much, and a few that are worth a lot.
2.6 Reform of the Patent and IPR System
To conclude our discussion, today there is a considerable
debate on reforming the patent- and IPR-system more generally.
This is prompted by some of the problems discussed earlier, as
well as by the recognition that, as shown in the previous section,
the economic values involved may not be trivial.
The reform of the patent system hinges on some key issues.
How to limit blocking and strategic patenting? How to increase
patenting for genuine reasons (e.g., by smaller firms, or to enhance
markets for technology)? Some discussions suggest the use of
renewal fees or other instruments to create different incentives to
patent, and particularly to discriminate between good and bad
intensions for patenting (e.g., François and Van Potellsberghe,
2009). As noted earlier, there is a growing discussion on how to
extend and perfect the European opposition system, including a
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of post-grant patent litigations and to create more diffused
mechanisms for checking the grant of patents (see, e.g., Gambar-
della, 2005; Hall, 2007). Finally, an important issue is how to
reduce the burden of examination of the patent offices in light of
the acceleration of patent applications. One question is whether
increases in the resources of the patent offices may produce higher
quality evaluations because of the lower number of applications
to be evaluated per examiner. There is evidence that the problem
may be more severe in the US than in the European Patent Office,
where the number of examiners per patent is higher (Guellec and
Van Pottelsberghe, 2007).
Another question regards the exemptions to patent
infringements. As noted, some fields are flooded with patents,
which makes it hard to launch a new project without infringing
some right. This may forestall innovation because of the risks of
infringement when starting a new research. The problem is
especially severe for academic and scientific research. A system of
exemptions from patent infringement could allow research
conducted for non-commercial reasons — particularly academic
research — not to be liable when it is clearly conducted for
scientific purposes or broadly defined goals. 
Of course, this is an area where an open-source system
hinging on the GPL can help. The GPL system cannot do much
if the field is already filled with patents. In this case, policy has
to act through the research exemptions to open up the field. When
the soil is more virgin, a combination of GPL and patents offer
the possibility of privatizing some innovations, while leaving entire
trajectories, and thus parts of the field, public. As discussed earlier,
the ideal outcome is that narrow innovations are protected by
clear and crisp patents, while more general fields and outputs are
left public. This is clearly easier to say than to do. But policy
should create the right institutions and conditions to get as close
as possible to this goal. 
At the same time, to achieve this objective it is crucial that
policy finds ways to ensure the enforcement of the GPL. This is
a serious problem. In the US patents are strongly enforced in
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fragmentation of national patent jurisdictions. While some coun-
tries may have stronger enforcements (e.g., Germany), the need to
enforce patents through separate interventions in the other coun-
tries not only means that the costs of enforcement can be high,
but also that there may be different outcomes according to the
positions of the different countries or courts. In the emerging
economies the enforcement of patents is even weaker. All these
problems are more severe in the case of the GPL. Being a new
institution, there is no tradition of enforcing it in courts. There is
evidence that this is changing, though the change is not yet wide-
spread. As noted earlier, the possibility of enforcing the GPL in
courts is the only way to diffuse this institution beyond the set of
communities that abide by it for sociological or other reasons, and
to make it a proper instrument of a broader policy for the devel-
opment and diffusion of knowledge. Once this step is made, the
GPL can become an institution that enforces public knowledge,
and contributes to a policy architecture that balances the differ-
ent forces that push for public or private knowledge. The com-
bination of IPR and open source is probably the most important
challenge of a policy for knowledge in the next few years.
3. - Implications for Italy
The Italian system is at the margin of the international debate
on IPR, open source and the economics of knowledge more
generally. First and foremost, Table 1 shows that in Italy the
number of patents per millions of inhabitants is well lower than
other advanced countries. There has been an upward trend since
the mid-1990s. However, the Italian acceleration has been roughly
similar to the other advanced nations, with the result that there
is no catching up, in spite of the fact that Italy starts from a lower
basis of patents.
At the same time, while there is no systematic data on the
matter, Italy shows a good deal of activity in open source.
Apparently, there are a fair number of software communities, and
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04 Gambardella_57_84  3-06-2009  11:12  Pagina 73there is attention to open source, including demand of open-
source systems from the Public Administration. The Italian system
may then be better positioned than other countries, e.g., the US
or other European countries, to combine IPR and open source in
an architectural policy framework, as discussed in the previous
sections. In fact, Italy may face a problem opposite to the US,
Germany or Japan. In these countries, relatively strong IPR may
produce an excessive privatization of knowledge, along with the
problems of strategic patents and the other limitations discussed
earlier. By contrast, in Italy a disproportionate attention to open
source, or a strong push from the open-source communities,
which can be quite ideological on these matters, may lead to an
excessive extension of public knowledge. Even IPR on relatively
narrow and genuinely patentable innovations may become hard to
obtain or to enforce. As noted in the previous section, the broad
policy solution is to allow for crisp and clear patents on well defined
innovations, while keeping the more generic knowledge public. The
lack of patenting opportunities for specific innovations may forestall
the markets for technology, technological exploration, the division
of innovative labor, and all the potential benefits associated with a
well functioning IPR system.
The PatVal-EU survey offers the opportunity to dig into the
characteristics of the invention process in Italy. PatVal-EU
surveyed the first inventor, or other inventors if the first one could
not be found, listed in nearly 10,000 patents with priority date
1993-1997 applied to the European Patent Office (EPO). The
Italian patents (first inventor located in Italy) are 1,250. By the
same criterion, the other patents are from Denmark, France,
Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK. The
PatVal-EU distribution of patents by country reflects the country
distribution in the universe of EPO patents (see Giuri et al., 2007,
for details). Table 2 summarizes the similarities and differences
between Italy and the other PatVal-EU European countries
discussed below.
2
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PatVal-EU Report, which is cited in GIURI P.  et AL. (2007), and downloadable at
www.alfonsogambardella.it/PATVALFinalReport.pdf. Both GIURI P.  et AL. (2007) and
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from the inventors of the other countries in terms of gender, age
profile, and motivations. The typical inventor is male (more than
90%) and between 40 and 50 years old. He is motivated in part
by monetary goals, but largely also by the satisfaction to solve
technical problems, by reputation, and by the possibility of
advancing knowledge and technologies. In this respect, the
motivations of the inventors listed in the European patents look
more similar to academic scientists than to company managers.
PatVal-EU also finds that the average and median inventor
response about the economic value of their patents is not different
from the other countries. Since there are no reasons to believe
that the vagaries of these estimates differ across countries (apart
Of Intellectual Property, Open Source, etc. A GAMBARDELLA
75
TABLE 2
ITALIAN INVENTORS AND INVENTION PROCESSES, SIMILARITIES
AND DIFFERENCES WITH OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
FROM THE PATVAL-EU RESEARCH
Similarities
– Gender, age profile and
motivation of inventors
– Economic value of patents
–  Rate of economic utilization of
patents
– Share of patents used to create
new firms 
Differences
–  Lower education of Italian
inventors and higher share
employed in small-medium firms
–  Fewer external interactions of
Italian inventors in the invention
process
– Italian inventions less likely to be
the outcome of planned R&D
activities
– The previous two points suggest
lack of attention to management
of innovation and intellectual
property 
– Less developed technology markets
Source: PATVAL-EU (final report and GIURI P.  et AL., 2007).
the Final PatVal-EU report do not include the data on Denmark and Hungary,
which were added at a later stage. The content of the discussion below does not
change when we take into account the data for Denmark and Hungary.
04 Gambardella_57_84  3-06-2009  11:12  Pagina 75from Germany, see earlier), the Italian patents seem to be in line
with the values of other European countries. PatVal-EU also finds
that only two-thirds of the patents are used for some specific
economic or industrial purposes (internally, licensing, or else).
Again, the Italian share is not different from the other countries,
which suggests that Italy is not relatively less active in making use
of its patents. 
Finally, about 5% of the surveyed PatVal-EU patents are used
to create new firms. This can be thought of as a proxy for the de-
gree of technological entrepreneurship. The PatVal-EU data show
clearly that there is a UK-model, where almost 10% of the patents
are used to form new firms, and a German model, where less then
3% of the patents are employed for this purpose. This reflects a
well known difference between the two models of capitalism (e.g.,
Hall and Soskice, 2001). Innovation mirrors this pattern, viz. the
UK is a more conducive environment for technological entrepre-
neurship, whereas in Germany technological opportunities are
pursued mostly within established firms. Italy lays between these
two models, with a fair share of new companies from patents, al-
most 6%. This suggests that the well known entrepreneurial spirit
of the Italian traditional sectors does not disappear in technology-
based activities. Given the importance of new firm creation for
economic growth, this is an interesting signal about our country
that is worth understanding further.
At the same time, there are differences between Italy and the
other European countries. First, the PatVal-EU data indicate that
the Italian inventors differ from the inventors in the other
European countries in two dimensions: a) lower share of inventors
holding a PhD or university education; b) higher share of inventors
in small-medium firms. This reflects structural features of the
Italian system. The share of Italian population with a tertiary
degree is lower than other advanced countries, let alone the share
of PhDs, and the Italian industry structure exhibits a relatively
high presence of small and medium enterprises. These
characteristics also affect the innovation process.
A second set of differences regards the invention activity.
According to the PatVal-EU data, Italy shows less intensive
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04 Gambardella_57_84  3-06-2009  11:12  Pagina 76collaborations at the inventor level. First, there is a lower share
of patents in which at least one co-inventor listed in the patent is
employed in other organizations. Second, the interactions with
people other than the co-inventors are less important than in the
other countries. Third, external sources of knowledge for the
innovation (universities, customers, etc.) are less important in Italy
then elsewhere. Since we are dealing with patented innovations,
these findings may not extend to innovations that are not patented,
which are important in the Italian system. This may explain the
puzzle, as Italian firms are known for being active in their
interactions with customers, suppliers, or networks of external
parties, often inside industrial districts or local territories.
Patented innovations can be different, as they depend on more
formal innovation processes within structured organizations. In
the case of patented innovations Italy may not abide as much as
other countries by the rules of “open innovation”. 
This result may be combined with the earlier ones that
inventors are relatively less educated and operate in smaller firms.
This suggests that, compared to other European countries, Italian
innovations are to a greater extent the result of individual efforts
or those of small groups within firm boundaries. An old study by
Gibbons and Johnston (1974) shows that employees with
university education are more open to relationships outside their
firms. This view of the Italian inventors being part of small closed
groups within firm boundaries is reinforced by another PatVal-EU
finding. Compared to the other European countries, fewer
inventions in Italy are the outcomes of targeted and planned R&D
projects, and they are more likely to be by-products of research
aimed at other goals, or of non-research activities, or they are the
result of pure inspiration or creativity. This may reflect differences
in the industrial composition across countries. In Italy there may
be a larger share of industries where pure creativity or less-
intensive R&D processes are more important. Yet, this is also
consistent with the previous results. The relatively lower
importance of formal R&D processes means that inventors do not
deliberately plan relationships with outside parties, which are
often organized as part of formal R&D activities. Similarly, formal
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typically hire employees with university degrees or PhDs.
In sum, open innovation needs planning, and the conclusion
that R&D in Italian firms does not appear to be planned as much
as in other countries, may explain why open innovation is less
advanced than elsewhere. These results also suggest that in Italian
firms the management of IPR (including licensing strategies), let
alone an effective combination of IPR and open source, is
probably still at a primitive stage. This is also consistent with a
final result of the PatVal-EU survey that we want to discuss here.
One of the PatVal-EU questions asked whether the firm was
willing to license the patent in question, and if so whether the
patent was actually licensed or not. This offers a picture of the
willingness to license as well as of the effective licensing of
patents. Gambardella et al. (2007) study these processes through
a detailed econometric exercise, and discuss the determinants of
both the willingness to license and actual licensing.
Here we show instead the country shares of licensed patents
and of the patents that the firms are willing to license. They are
in Graph 3. The Graph corroborates our earlier remark about the
UK vs. German model. In the UK firms are willing to license more
than one-third of the patents, with about half of them actually
licensed. In Germany, the share is half of the UK share. This
suggests that in Germany patents are more likely to be exploited
internally by the firm that owns them, while in the UK one is
more likely to observe an open model in which patents are licensed
to others in technology markets. Note also that compared to
Germany, in the UK there is a higher share of patents that the
firms are willing to license but that are not licensed. This suggests
that in Germany licensing is itself part of a more deliberate and
planned strategy, and thus firms are more likely to end up
licensing if they decide to do so. By contrast, the UK is more likely
to feature potential technology suppliers that hinge on licensing
business models, and this prompts them to be more explorative
in their search for potential licensees. 
The other countries range between the UK and the German
model. In particular, Italy and France are closer to the German
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04 Gambardella_57_84  3-06-2009  11:12  Pagina 78shares. Though it has few patents, Hungary is largely betting on
licensing. Italy has the lowest shares of patent licensed. In part,
this may stem from the fact that it may be closer to the German
or Continental European model. In part, however, this may stem
from our earlier remarks. There is less intentionality in the Ital-
ian invention process. Particularly, there is less planning of in-
ventions than in other economies, and this includes little atten-
tion to patent licensing (whether in or out) as a profitable op-
portunity. Thus, technology markets in Italy are underdeveloped.
Similarly, this provides evidence of the lack of attention to the
management of intellectual property. As noted, the formation of
specialized units for managing intellectual property entails stra-
tegic attention on what should be patented and how, as well as
on the uses of patents. Apart from internal use, this includes li-
censing out as a source of revenue or for other purposes (see,
e.g., Lichtenthaler, 2007), and licensing in. In sum, the weak mar-
ket for technology in Italy may reflects this limited focus on in-
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04 Gambardella_57_84  3-06-2009  11:12  Pagina 79tellectual property and the need for raising managerial attention
on this matter.
4. - Conclusions
This paper has tried to discuss trends and opportunities
associated with the rise of IPR, the combination of IPR and open
source, and the management of intellectual property and of
knowledge more generally. 
The diagnosis of the Italian system suggests that Italy, which
has fewer patents than other advanced economies, is not part of
the international debate on IPR and related institutions, and the
Italian firms are not active in the management of their intellec-
tual property. There are clearly exceptions, both at the level of
firms and policy institutions. Also, some Italian open-source com-
munities are active internationally. Yet, by and large, Italy as a
system does not seem to be well entrenched into the debate about
the institutions and the management of knowledge assets. One re-
mark of this paper is that the Italian system is less active in pur-
suing open innovation opportunities, as implied by the fact the
inventors of the Italian patents show fewer external interactions
in the invention process, and by the primitive stages of the Ital-
ian market for technology. 
Therapies are hard to design, and in this respect the purpose
of this paper may simply be to flag that Italian firms should start
investing in the management of their intellectual assets, including
a greater strategic focus on licensing in and out, the creation of
spinoffs, or technology-based alliances. For policy institutions, we
need greater participation in the international debate that is
shaping the institutions for knowledge of the XXI century.
Two specific remarks can serve as a conclusion. The first one
is a proposal to launch an Italian Inventor Compensation Act like
in Germany. The German Act compensates inventors for their
patented inventions according to the returns that the invention
produces for the employers. According to Hoisl and Harhooff
(2007), it has pros and cons. Thus, one has to take the German
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employees to pay greater attention to the innovation processes, to
launch and disclose new ideas, and other such factors. Given that
in the end this amounts to rewarding people in relation to the
value of their invention, one can think of it as a mechanism for
creating spinoffs based on ideas, or for sponsoring ideas whose
costs are incurred only if the idea is potentially successful. Today,
many leading companies worldwide have launched programs to
encourage the inventiveness of their employees (e.g., Shell).
Moreover, Gambardella et al. (2008) show that the two major
determinants of the value of patented inventions are the resources
invested in the process and the talent and experience of the
inventors. Encouraging these talents can then be a major
opportunity for stimulating the Italian innovation system.
The second remark is that, as noted earlier in this paper, Italy
is in a good position to propose an institutional model that
balances the forces that push for private or public knowledge. The
country could design a system in which both IPR and GPL are
enforced. The aim is an architectural policy in which narrower
innovations are patented, and more generic knowledge remains
public. As noted, other countries - and the US in particular - have
gone too much in the direction of privatizing knowledge. Today
there is discussion about the undesired consequences of this
process, and about the remedies to problems like strategic
patenting or trolls. A similar debate is in course in Europe. Since
Italy is greenfield in this area, it could test a model in which
different elements are combined, and policy goals are defined
according to the different benefits of privatizing knowledge vs.
keeping it public. Italy could then contribute to the international
debate both with practical experience within the country, and by
proposing new mechanisms and policy instruments. This can have
far-reaching implications for firm management, industry structure,
and ultimately for economic growth.
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